

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5518

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USMISSION USUN

USMISSION USNATO

ERDA HQ WASHDC

ERDA GERMANTOWN

DOD WASHDC

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EO 11652: NA

TAGS: PARM, CCD, SW

SUBJ: CCD: THORSSON MARCH 3 STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING SWEDISH
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT CTB TREATY

REF: GENEVA 1148

1. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT MADE BY SWEDISH REP (THORSSON)
AT MARCH 3 PLENARY, ACCOMPANYING SUBMISSION OF THEIR DRAFT
CTB TREATY. DRAFT EXT SUBMITTED CCD MARCH 3IIS
IDENTICAL TO TEXT CONTAINED REFTEL. BEGIN TEXT:

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STATEMENT BY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, MRS INGA THORSSON MMP.
LEADER OF THE SWEDISH DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, ON THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 1977

MR. CHAIRMAN,

AT OUR 729TH MEETING ON 17 FEB I STATED THAT THERE SEEMS

TO BE REASON TO HOPE FOR A NEW ATMOSPHERE, FOR NEW POSSIBILITIES AT LONG LAST TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE AND REAL RESULTS IN DISARMAMENT. I EMPHASIZED THAT DISARMAMENT IS A TRULY INTERNATIONAL CONCERN. THE SMALLER COUNTRIES HAVE THEREFORE EVERY REASON TO MAKE ACTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORK OF THE CCD. IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I ANNOUNCED THE INTENTION OF THE SWEDISH DELEGATION TO SUBMIT, IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, A DRAFT CTB TREATY. I HAVE ASKED FOR THE FLOOR THIS MORNING TO INTRODUCE A WORKING PAPER (CCD/526) CONTAINING A DRAFT TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS.

BUT LET ME FIRST ADDRESS MYSELF IN RATHER GENERAL TERMS TO THE VIEWS EXPRESSED AND THE DRAFT TREATY TEXT SUBMITTED BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR ON THE SAME SUBJECT, WHEN HE TOOK THE FLOOR AT OUR MEETING ON FEB 22. I LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST AND QUITE A LOT OF SATISFACTION TO HIS STATEMENT. IN PARTICULAR I NOTED THAT THE USSR IS PREPARED TO GIVE TO THE CCD A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE PREPARATION OF A CTB TREATY. THIS IS A RECOGNITION OF SUCH A TREATY AS BEING OF TRUE CONCERN TO THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS AN IMPORTANT MEANS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, THAT IS MUCH WELCOMED. I ALSO NOTED THAT THE USSR CONFIRMED ITS PREPAREDNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SEARCH FOR METHODS OF ASCERTAINING ON SITE RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES OF A SEISMIC EVENT IN ADDITION TO RELYING ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

I HAVE HOWEVER ALSO NOTED SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR VIEWS ON THE CTB SUBJECT AND THOSE OF THE USSR DELEGATION. TIME HAS INDEED BEEN TOO SHORT TO ALLOW DETAILED COMMENTS UPON THE USSR
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PROPOSAL BUT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING BRIEF REMARKS.

THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF A CTB TREATY MUST OBVIOUSLY BE UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE. TO ASK THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES NEGOTIATE, SIGN AND RATIFY A CTB TREATY AS A PRECONDITION FOR ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE, WILL NOT HOWEVER GIVE THE WORLD A CTB IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THAT IS WHY WE INSIST THAT THE TWO LEADING NUCLEAR POWERS WITH THEIR OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY IN THIS FIELD MUST START THE PROCESS. AVAILABLE FACTS POINT CONVINCINGLY TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WHEN THE TWO MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS AGREE TO HALT THEIR UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING, THEIR MILITARY SECURITY WILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED.

FURTHERMORE WE TAKE THE POSITION THAT THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS SHOULD ON PRINCIPLE BE INCLUDED AMONG THE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE TO BE BANNED. IN ARTICLE III OF THE USSR DRAFT TREATY, ON THE OTHER HAND, REFERENCE IS MADE TO ARTICLE VI OF THE NPT AS FAR AS THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ARE CONCERNED. WE CONSIDER THE NPT TO BE DISCRIMINATORY IN THIS AS IN SOME OTHER RESPECTS

AND WE WANT THE RESTRICTIONS ON PNE'S TO APPLY TO ALL STATES
INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

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I WANT NOW TO PROCEED TO DEAL WITH THE SWEDISH WORKING PAPER
AND ITS BASIC PROVISIONS. CERTAINLY THIS DOCUMENT CANNOT INCOR-
PORATE ONLY NEW IDEAS ON THE MUCH DISCUSSED QUESTION OF A
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. MANY DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING MY OWN, HAVE
BEEN WORKING IN THIS FIELD DURING THE 15 YEARS LIFETIME SO FAR
OF THIS COMMITTEE. MANY ELEMENTS IN THE DRAFT ARE CLOSELY
CONNECTED WITH IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS PUT FORWARD BY DELEGATIONS
EITHER IN GENERAL STATEMENTS OR IN PREVIOUS DRAFTS AND OTHER
WORKING PAPERS. BUT OUR PROPOSAL ALSO ATTEMPTS TO ADD NEW IDEAS
IN ORDER TO TRY TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS WHICH UP TO NOW
HAVE BLOCKED PROGRESS.

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WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS DRAFT IS INCOMPLETE IN SO FAR AS THE TEXTS OF A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS NEED TO BE WORKED OUT AND NEGOTIATED IN THE CCD. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE DRAFT WILL CERTAINLY BE AMENDED AS THE RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THIS COMMITTEE. WE ARE THUS OFFERING THIS WORKING PAPER AS OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORK OF THE CCD, INTENDED TO FORM A BASIS FOR CONCRETE AND SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION WHICH WE HOPE WILL START AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE DURING THIS YEAR'S SESSION.

WITH YOUR PERMISSION I SHALL NOW COMMENT IN MORE DETAIL ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT PROPOSAL.

ARTICLE I DEFINES THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY I.E. THE BAN OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST EXPLOSIONS AND OF ANY EXPLOSION OF OTHER NUCLEAR DEVICES IN ANY ENVIRONMENT. WE HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT A CTB WILL HAVE TO BE ALL EMBRACING AND SHOULD NOT BE ONLY A COMPLEMENT TO THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963. THE TREATY SHOULD THUS BE INDEPENDENT AND COMPREHENSIVE. SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS MAY, HOWEVER, BE NEEDED IN TWO CASES. THE FIRST ONE CONCERNS THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME KIND OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD PROVE NECESSARY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE SECOND REFERS TO PNE'S. I WILL COME BACK TO THE LATTER CASE WHEN DISCUSSING THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE II AND PROTOCOL II. THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS COULD IN OUR VIEW BE TREATED IN TWO ALTERNATIVE WAYS. ONE POSSIBILITY COULD BE TO MAKE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY DEPENDENT UPON THE FINAL CESSATION BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS. THIS SOLUTION IS INCORPORATED IN ARTICLE VII PARA 4 (BETWEEN THE DASHED LINES). THE PROVISIONS OF A PROTOCOL I ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR A SPECIFIED TIME SHOULD BE BINDING FOR THOSE TWO STATES ON THEIR SIGNING OF THE TREATY. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT COULD POSSIBLY FACILITATE AN EARLY ENTERING INTO FORCE OF THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AS THESE STIPULATIONS WILL START TO BE APPLIED ALREADY BEFORE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BY THE TWO STATES. WE PRESUME THAT MEANWHILE OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD SIGN AND RATIFY THE TREATY. IT SHOULD THEN ENTER UNCLASSIFIED

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INTO FORCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION IS FORESEEN IN ARTICLE I, PARA 4. THIS ALTERNATIVE STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EARLY ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY. THE PROVISIONS ON A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT WOULD IN THIS CASE BE INCLUDED IN THE TREATY ITSELF. THIS ALTERNATIVE IS PERHAPS MORE IN CONFORMITY WITH WHAT IS USUALLY APPLIED IN OTHER TREATIES. THE PROVISIONS OF PROTOCOL I SHOULD IN OUR VIEW BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS IN QUESTION UNDER CCD

AUSPICES. THIS MEANS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO KEEP OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CCD WELL INFORMED ABOUT THE PROGRESS IN THEIR WORK. SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES EXIST HOW TO PHASE OUT THE NUCLEAR TESTS DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. WE ARE QUITE CONFIDENT, THAT IF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS CANNOT MOVE DIRECTLY TO AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF ALL WEAPON TESTING AND, CONSEQUENTLY, A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS NEEDED, AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND RATHER QUICKLY THROUGH THE SUGGESTED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS.

I STATED HERE TWO WEEKS AGO THAT WE FEEL ON THE SWEDISH SIDE THAT THE POSSIBLE INTEREST IN CARRYING OUT PNE'S MUST YIELD TO THE URGENCY OF ACHIEVING A CTB. BUT IT MIGHT GENERALLY BE

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CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBILITIES OF FUTURE PNE'S. PROVISIONS TO THIS EFFECT ARE TO BE FOUND IN ARTICLE II AND ARE PLANNED TO BE ELABORATED IN DETAIL IN PROTOCOL II. PNE'S SHOULD, IN OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, BE ALLOWED ONLY WHEN THEY ARE OF OVERRIDING NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE. THE PARTY

REQUESTING A PNE BE IT A NUCLEAR OR NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE, WOULD BE OBLIGED TO SUBMIT THE PROJECT TO STRICT INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION AND CONTROL ACCORDING TO PROCEDURES AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY INCLUDING THOSE PERTAINING TO A SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON PNE'S AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE V OF THE NPT.

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ARTICLE III DEALS WITH THE IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION AND CONTROL OF THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY. WE SUGGEST HERE I.A. THE SAME PROVISION AS IN THE SWEDISH DRAFT TREATY OF 1971 (CCD/348), I.E. THE SOL-CALLED VERIFICATION BY CHALLENGE. WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY TO INCLUDE - PERHAPS AT A SOMEWHAT LATER STAGE- PROVISIONS REGARDING THE INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON A WORLD-WIDE SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE. WE PRESUME THAT PROVISIONS ON SUCH ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY CAN BE INSERTED IN A PROTOCOL III. FURTHERMORE WE PROPOSE PROVISIONS FOR SSETTING UP A CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, THE FUNCTIONS AND RULES OF PROCEDURES OF WHICH TO BE NEGOTIATED IN THE CCD AND INCLUDED IN PROTOCOL IV OF THE TREATY. AS A LOGICAL LAST STEP IN THE PROCESS OF VERIFICATION ARTICLE III PARA 5 GIVES PARTIES TO THE TREATY A POSSIBILITY TO BRING THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

ARTICLE IV AND V ARE, WE BELIEVE, UNCONTROVERSIAL. ARTICLE VI DEALS WITH REVIEW CONFERENCES AND IS COPIED FROM THE SEA-BED TREATY. AS REGARDS ARTICLE VIII, DEALING WITH SIGNING, RATIFICATION AND ENTERING INTO FORCE, I HAVE ALREADY DWELT ON THE SUBJECT OF A POSSIBLE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT CONTAINED IN ARTICLE VII. THE ONLY REMAINING ARTICLE WHICH I WISH TO COMMENT UPON TODAY IS ARTICLE IX WHICH FORESEES THE POSSIBILITY FOR PARTIES TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT IF AT A GIVEN TIME NOT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES HAVE ADHERED TO THE TREATY. IT IS, OF COURSE, OUR FIRM HOPE THAT THESE PROVISIONS WILL NEVER BE APPLIED. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE PROPOSE THESE PROVISIONS IN ORDER TO GIVE ASSURANCES TO THE TWO NUCLEAR STATES WHICH HAVE TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THE PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND THE ABOLISHMENT FOR ALL TIMES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

MR CHAIRMAN, WE SUBMIT THIS DRAFT TREATY TO THE CCD WITH THE PURPOSE OF REACHING AN EARLY AGREEMENT IN THIS IMPORTANT FIELD OF DISARMAMENT. WORK ON A CTB WILL NOW BE STARTED AND WILL PROCEED AT SUCH A PACE THAT A FINAL AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED BEFORE THE 1978 SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED

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TO DISARMAMENT.

WITH THIS PURPOSE IN MIND THE SWEDISH DELEGATION FORMALLY PROPOSE
THAT A WORKING GROUP BE SET UP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO START THE
URGENT WORK TO NEGOTIATE A CTBT. END TEXT. CATTO

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